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I Introduction
The ExternE project developed a methodology for the quantification of external-
ities from different power generation technologies. Under the Joule II program the
methodology has been applied to a number of fuel cycles in 8 EU Member States
and in Norway. A number of case studies are carried out in these countries, using
the external cost data generated by the project. This paper presents the results of
a policy case under the Belgian implementation of ExternE. The objective of this
case study is to provide some insight into ExternE damage costs for the Belgian
electricity sector in relation to the design of electricity taxes. Special reference is
made to electricity taxes in proposals on the taxation of energy at the European
level. Some thought is given on how to bridge the distance between damage cost
research and political decision making in the area of energy taxation.
Developing this type of case studies is also part of a broader endeavour as word-
ed in the chapter 40 of Agenda 21 ("Information for decision making"), which
calls for, among other elements, the collection of multi-sectoral information and
the use thereof in decision processes. According to Agenda 21 special attention in
that respect is to be paid to the transformation of existing information into a form
that is useful to decision making and policy planning.
Reliable data on external costs of electricity generation could be a useful input
into the design of electricity taxes. ExternE data on external environmental costs
of fuel cycles in the Belgian power generation sector are presently available under
the Belgian ExternE implementation. Economic theory on external costs (environ-
mental or other) states that these costs should be accounted for in market prices
to ensure a proper allocation of resources and to achieve maximum social welfare.
Taxation is a possible instrument to ensure that external costs of electricity pro-
duction are internalised in electricity end-user prices.
The theory behind full cost pricing, however, cannot easily be applied, as it relies
on strict assumptions that are not easily met in reality. Assumptions made include
the existence of clear preferences and the existence of competitive markets, which
in reality are only partially or not met. Although a straightforward application of
full cost pricing is impossible, some research is available on how to “correct” ex-
ternal damage costs to obtain second-best cost “adders” applicable in real-life
situations. This means that the optimal (from the point of view of society as a
whole) “adders” may well differ from the level of the damage costs. No attempt
is made here to transform ExternE damage costs into optimal electricity tax levels,
although research in the area would be interesting.Working Paper 3-98
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Although "optimal" tax rates may substantially differ from damage costs, by way
of an illustration, a comparison is made between damage costs and proposed Eu-
ropean electricity tax rates. Proposed European tax rates include the 1992
proposal on a CO2/energy tax and the more recent proposal on the restructuring
of the Community framework for the taxation of energy products in the EC. Such
an “at a glance” comparison may put the order of magnitude of the external dam-
age costs in perspective. The 1997 proposal on the restructuring of the
Community framework for the taxation of energy products extends the mini-
mum rate system for mineral oils to other energy products, including to
electricity. The proposal includes a consumption tax on electricity, with initially
low rates. Though such a consumption tax does not allow differentiating tax rates
in accordance with damage specific to the different input fuels in power genera-
tion, it may offer a number of possibilities to integrate ExternE damage cost data.
The proposal leaves Member States the possibility to impose, in addition to the
electricity tax, a (non-harmonised) tax on inputs in electricity generation. The lev-
el of such a non-harmonised input tax could be modulated according to the
external damage costs of the different input fuels. The proposal also leaves Mem-
ber states the possibility to refund the revenues of the consumption tax to
producers using renewable sources. The modalities of such a subsidy could take
environmental external costs into account.Working Paper 3-98
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II Environmental policy and external 
damage costs of electricity generation 
in Belgium
A.Environmental policy in the electricity sector
Belgium is committed to sustainable development since the Rio Agreements. No
full consensus exists up to now as to the steps which should be taken to imple-
ment the Agenda 21, but the careful use of scarce energy resources and the
reduction of harmful emissions by the electricity sector are no doubt among the
major concerns. The electricity sector in Belgium was responsible for 27% of Bel-
gian  SO2 emissions, 15% of NOx emissions1 (in 1993), and some 19% of CO2
emissions2 (in 1994).
In October 1991, central electricity producers agreed with the government on a
SO2 and NOx emission reduction scheme for the period 1993-2003, based on 1980
emissions. Based on the 1988 EC Large Combustion Plant Directive, the agree-
ment applies the "bubble" concept whereby a reduction is imposed on the total
emissions of the sector. For SO2, a reduction of emissions with 75% by 1998 com-
pared to their 1980 level was agreed (with a target value of -77,5%) and a
reduction of 80% by 2003 (with a target value of -85%).
For NOx, a reduction of 40% by 1998 compared to emissions in 1980 was agreed as
well as stabilisation of the emissions at that level until 2003 (with a target value
for 2003 of -45%). The agreement also includes supply of power plants without
flue gas de-sulphurisation with low sulphur fuels (maximum 1%) and the intro-
duction of measures to reduce the NOx emissions in existing plants. The sector has
already largely met the agreed SO2 and NOx reduction objectives3. SO2 emissions
decreased with 80% from their level of 352.000 tons in 1980 to 68.781 tons in 1996.
NOx emissions in 1980 were at 87.010 tons and decreased with 42% to 50.623 tons
in 1996. Dust emissions decreased with 75% from their level of 23.730 tons in 1980
to 5.884 tons in 1996.
1. Figures taken from the Belgian Communication under the Long Range Transboundary Air Pollu-
tion (LRT AP) Convention, 1995. The electricity sector includes power generation, combined heat 
and power (CHP) installations and urban public heat systems.
2. First Belgian National Communication on Greenhouse Gases, January 1997, Chapter 2: Inventory 
of emissions.
3. Electrabel, SPE, 1997.Working Paper 3-98
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Regarding global warming, the Belgian government, during its Council of minis-
ters of 6 June 1991, has committed itself to reduce Belgian CO2 emissions with 5%
from their 1990 level by the year 2000. In 1996, Belgian power plants emitted
22.555 Kt CO2. Emissions were down with 29% from their 1980 level of 31.604 Kt
and have been relatively stable since 1990. Increasing electricity demand drives
development of the emissions. Electricity demand grows faster than the demand
for alternative energy products. The sector's national investment plan for 1995-
20051 foresees future emission growth will have to be limited by a planned in-
crease in combined heat and power generation (CHP), the introduction of new
STAG plants and by actions to reduce demand. Nuclear electricity can only play a
limited role in the reduction of CO2 emissions. The increase of nuclear capacity is
restricted to small production increases of existing units and the recent introduc-
tion of the Chooz B nuclear plant.
With respect to demand control, the 1995-2005 investment programme puts for-
ward demand-side management (DSM) measures that should top off 8 TWh (or
8%) of total electricity demand as projected by the BVEO/CGEE2, the Board of elec-
tricity producers, in 20053. Demand is projected to grow from some 74 TWh in
1995, with 2,7% annually, to some 88,5 TWh in 2005. During 1996, 200 Mio BF
(around 5,2 Mio ECU) was spent on a programme for rational energy use in pro-
duction. This annual amount will increase to 450 Mio BF (or 11,5 Mio ECU) by 2005.
During 1996, financial means that became available through tariff reform meas-
ures in distribution were reserved for rational energy use measures in
distribution.
1. Beheerscomité van de Elektriciteitsondernemingen / Comité de Gestion des Entreprises de 
l'Electricité (BCEO/CGEE), Nationaal uitrustingsprogramma inzake de middelen voor productie 
en transport van elektriciteit 1995-2005. Samenvatting en toelichting (National equipment plan 
on production and transport of electricity), 17 November 1995.
2. BCEO/CGEE: Beheerscomité van de Elektriciteitsondernemingen / Comité de Gestion des Entre-
prises de l'Electricité.
3. With respect to end use savings, several studies have in recent years estimated the existing 
potential for electricity savings. These studies show the under-exploitation of an important 
potential for economically efficient energy savings, primarily in the use of electricity. A technical-
economic study by Econotec (“Contribution du Modèle EPM à l’estimation des mesures fiscales et 
non-fiscales prévues dans le Programme Belge de Réduction des Emissions de CO2”, Econotec, 
September 1996) estimated the existing economic electric energy saving potential (at prevailing 
1995 energy prices) at 1.899 MWh in 2000 rising to 4.119 MWh in 2005 (2,6% and 5,7% respectively 
of 1996 net electricity production in Belgium). A study by STEM (“CO2-Emissie Vermindering 
door Elektriciteitsbesparing”, STEM, November 1995) estimated the economic saving potential at 
13% to 19% of consumption in 2000 and at 21% to 31% in 2005. A 1994 study by CES (“Energie en 
Milieu in het federaal België”, CES, KU-Leuven, March 1994) considers a saving potential of 3,5% 
of total final consumption in 2000 (under a policy scenario including a CO2/energy tax) and of 
14,1% (under a scenario including a CO2/energy tax and an extensive package of additional 
measures designed to reach Belgium’s CO2 emission reduction commitment for 2000).Working Paper 3-98
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B.External environmental damage costs
The Belgian ExternE project has measured external costs for a number of refer-
ence plants, based on 1995 emissions (table 1). Damage costs used in this chapter
refer to the data using a 3% discount rate for fossil fuels, and a 0% discount rate
and a time horizon of 10.000 years for damages from the nuclear cycle. The dam-
age costs measure residual damage, i.e. damage remaining after the application
of current environmental policy. Some of the environmental effects have not been
quantified, although they may be high, such as thermal discharge of the coal
plant.
Total annual damage resulting from the Belgian power production in 1995, based
on a relatively low damage estimate for global warming (18 ECU/tonne of CO2),
amounts to 2256 Mio ECU. Total damage represents some 1,2% of 1995 GDP.
Source: VITO.
TABLE 1 - Summary of Belgian “ExternE best estimate” damage costs of electricity fuel cycles, 1995 










0,72 0,72 0,07 3,62 3,54
Production
SO2 51,84 5,16 0,01
NOx 42,51 9,31 2,74
TSP 2,30 2,44 0,00
Ozone 4,20 0,86 0,26
Other 3,56 0,33 0,08
Public health 0,37 0,37
Occupational health, 
noise
0,27 0,27 0,04 0,04 0,04
Major accidents 0,00 0,00
Global warming
Low (18 ecu/ton CO2) 17,30 17,90 7,40 0,09 0,08
High (46 ecu/ton CO2) 44,30 45,80 18,80 0,23 0,20
total
Low global warming 122,70 37,00 10,60 4,12 4,03
High global warming 149,70 64,80 22,00 4,26 4,15Working Paper 3-98
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III Full cost pricing
Full cost pricing refers to the pricing of commercial goods - such as electric power
- that would include into the final prices faced by the end-user not only the pri-
vate costs of inputs, but also the costs of the externalities created by their
production1. Full cost pricing refers to the reflection into final prices of all exter-
nalities, environmental or other. In this text, we will use full cost pricing to refer
to external environmental costs from the electricity sector.
Competitive markets maximise economic welfare if all costs of production are ac-
counted for in prices. When prices do not include all costs of production, e.g.
when some environmental impacts are not accounted for, this leads to inefficien-
cies. This is so because in the absence of additional measures, private actors do
not take these costs into account. The objective of full cost pricing then is to re-
duce the emissions of CO2, SO2, NOx and PM to the extent that effects on morbidity,
mortality and production are fully included in the final price through appropriate
instruments. There are theoretical reasons to suggest welfare benefits from the
imposition of full cost pricing. The internalisation of external costs increases total
welfare by reducing negative impacts on health, materials, and the environment.
If the full costs are calculated correctly, the losses in producer and consumer sur-
plus and environmental rents are more than offset by the increases in quality of
life and the reductions in health and maintenance costs.
What are the appropriate instruments to internalise the damage costs? The case
of a Pigouvian tax is that a tax equal to the marginal damage caused by an exter-
nal activity would result in a situation where the marginal damages are equated
to the marginal costs of abatement. In this way, fully optimised use of resources
is achieved, by undoing the misallocation of resources caused by the existence of
the external effects. Possible instruments to internalise external environmental
costs are emission taxes, full cost adders2, or the trading of emission permits. The
height of the tax, the fee, the adder or the price of the permit reflects the external
costs. When added to the private cost of production "full cost pricing" would be
achieved. The reflection of full costs should have an effect on the choice of fuels
and on the production technology used, and on electricity demand.
The theoretical benefit of full cost pricing has been illustrated by a number of em-
pirical studies. Jan Keppler and Tom Kram3 discuss two case studies, for the
1. Jan Keppler and Tom Kram, July 1996.
2. Adders act as a surcharge to internalise external costs in the planning of additional investment in 
the electricity sector, or in dispatch decisions of electric utility systems. The adder represents an 
amount per unit of emission, that is added hypothetically to the private costs when considering 
capacity planning (“investment planning adder”) or when planning operation of the plants 
(“dispatch adder”). Although the adders are not actually charged, they can significantly influ-
ence investment or dispatch decisions.Working Paper 3-98
8
Netherlands and Italy, where the application of full cost adders for the pollutants
SO2, NOx and particulate matter would result in substantial reductions of these
emissions. The damage costs used were taken from the ExternE project. The re-
sults were measured against a hypothetical base case in which existing emission
control policies were discontinued. The full cost adders did not include damage
for CO2, but the authors also discuss the impact of full cost pricing for the regional
pollutants on CO2. The link between full cost adders and the greenhouse effect is
thus indirect in their study. The effect on CO2 emissions can vary depending on
the time frame and the energy system in question, and the resulting CO2 emission
reductions in the two cases considered can range from less than 1% to 10%. A
study on the Belgian electricity sector is that of S. Proost and J. Van Rompuy1.
They show that the welfare advantages to be expected from an emission charge
or tradable permit system are potentially high (see further, point 1.1.3).
The availability of environmental damage costs such as in the ExternE project
would allow for an “economic textbook” application of a Pigouvian tax. Howev-
er, in practice there are a number of limitations to the application of full cost
pricing.
A first problem has to with the existence of clearly established dose-impact rela-
tionships and the possibility to satisfactorily express the impact on welfare in
monetary values (the existence of clear preferences). A case in point is the damage
related to nuclear accidents, that have a low probability to occur but with a real
risk to result in high damages when they occur. Such “high damage – low proba-
bility” events make it difficult to express clear preferences. Another example is
the global warming problem. The structure of the problem, the relationships be-
tween causes and effects are complex and therefore it is difficult to express clear
preferences with respect to it. In consequence, a Pigouvian approach seems to be
difficult to apply concerning environmental externalities of nuclear power gener-
ation and global warming. The framework can more safely be applied where
externalities are best quantitatively established, i.e. for a number of regional pol-
lutants such as SO2, NOx, and particulate matter.
Secondly, the economic theory that provides the basis for full cost pricing as-
sumes a competitive market. A competitive electricity market implies that
electricity demand is steered by efficient pricing, meaning marginal cost pricing.
The ideal tariff should vary with time, place, and reliability of supply. In reality,
however, tariff mechanisms have not been fine-tuned to reflect marginal produc-
tion costs. If the electricity market is not competitive but characterised by
monopolistic behaviour, prices may be higher than would have been the case in
a competitive market. Full cost pricing could imply further electricity price in-
creases, thereby worsening the existing distortions and increasing economic
costs. The possibility of welfare losses linked to full cost pricing in the presence
of pre-existing distortions is not imaginary. In Belgium, as in other parts of Eu-
rope, the electricity industry is heavily regulated and the benefits of full cost
pricing must be balanced against the possible exacerbation of existing distortions.
A third reason why the application of full cost pricing is not straightforward in
practice is that it can have perverse effects when it does not apply across all fuels.
3. Jan Keppler and Tom Kram, July 1996.
1. S. Proost and J. Van Rompuy, 1996.Working Paper 3-98
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When price of electricity increases compared to the prices of close substitute en-
ergy products, unwanted substitution of primary fuels for purchased electricity
may occur, resulting in welfare reduction (this is the so-called "piecemeal prob-
lem"). To some extent, this is one of the issues that the European Commission tries
to address in its recent proposal on the restructuring of the Community frame-
work for the taxation of energy products. The proposed restructuring extends the
existing excise tax systems for mineral oils to the entire range of energy products,
including electricity. The objective of this proposal is not only to diminish distor-
tions between countries but also between different types of fuels.
A more practical problem linked to full cost pricing is that the imposition of the
full costs in one country could make its electricity more expensive in comparison
to another. This could lead to increased imports (of possibly higher emitting elec-
tricity production from countries that do not impose full costs). If the imposed
taxes are high it could also cause competitiveness problems for the country's in-
dustry. The problem is certainly true for a small country like Belgium, where
short distances to foreign electricity producers do not impose unacceptable losses
in transmission. Referring again to the Commission proposal on the taxation of
energy products, the imposition of minimum tax rates throughout the EU would
to some extent address the problem of distortions of competition stemming from
the application of different tax structures and rates throughout the Community.
To the extent however that the tax rates in the Commission proposal do not imply
the application of full costs, and if Member States want to impose higher taxes
than the minimum, as the proposal would allow them to, they may find that their
room of manoeuvre remains rather limited.
The level of uncertainty linked to damage cost estimates, the existence of other
distortions and other more practical problems, mean that the problem is not as
simple as to merely impose a Pigouvian tax in accordance with the size of the
damage costs. It is therefore not surprising that full cost pricing in the sense dis-
cussed here has rarely been applied in practice.
One possible way forward would be to extend the theory so that it can better deal
with real world situations. Burtraw e.a.1 have provided a normative model for
appropriate consideration of external damage costs in the resource planning and
dispatch decisions of public utilities. The efficient policy, in the context of pre-ex-
isting emission regulation, considers the role of deviations from marginal cost
pricing in electricity pricing and the possibility of customer bypass of the utility
grid. They conclude that the second-best optimal adder for a power generation
technology will depart from the marginal damage related to it due to the econom-
ic inefficiency associated with second-best rate of return economic regulation and
due to the opportunity to bypass the electricity grid.
Alternatively, one could leave the theoretical framework of welfare maximisation
behind and settle for a less ambitious frame of thought. In this approach, one
would rather concentrate on the achievement of certain environmental objectives,
which are determined politically, with minimum cost. In principle economic in-
struments should result in lower economic costs than command and control
instruments. In reality, emission reductions have mostly been achieved through
regulation, whereby abatement levels were set at politically determined levels.
1. Dallas Burtraw, Winston Harrington, Alan J. Krupnick and A. Myrick Freeman III, 1995.Working Paper 3-98
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These instruments have often significantly reduced emissions, but they do not
necessarily have the welfare effect of full cost pricing. So far, when economic in-
struments were introduced, they have not been designed in order to internalise
damage costs. Tax and charge levels were set with specific emission reduction or
revenue collection objectives in mind.
Even if full cost pricing may be a too ambitious objective, a Pigouvian tax can help
in increasing welfare and combat some of the higher damages1. In addition, it has
been argued to insert the paradigm of static optimisation into a larger framework
that calls for the management of change of structural parameters in a dynamic
perspective2. The parameters involved include technological parameters, the de-
gree of competition, the form of regulation, and preferences to the extent that they
are amenable to policy action. Under the dynamic approach, the optimal policy
instrument depends on the situation at hand.
If the possibilities for the application of full cost pricing should be considered in
a dynamic context, then one important issue is the gradual liberalisation of elec-
tricity markets in the European Community. In this paper, the effect of the move
towards “re-regulated” electricity markets is not considered in detail, but it is
clearly of importance in its effects on environmental issues in the electricity sector
and also in its effect on the possibilities for the application of certain types of en-
vironmental policy instruments. With respect to the first element, the direct effect
of market liberalisation on the environmental impact of electricity production,
the belief is widely held that it may result in a more widespread use of smaller,
less capital-intensive generation units, meaning natural gas fuelled units. A more
widespread use of natural gas as input fuel would generally mean a decrease in
the harmful emissions of electricity production. With respect to the changed room
of manoeuvre for governments to apply certain types of instruments in a liberal-
ised setting, it appears that the applicability of taxation instruments is not
endangered, but rather reinforced. A general argument in this respect is that a
taxation type of instrument fits in well in a liberalised market, where govern-
ments could prefer a more “at arm-length” policy approach towards the
electricity sector, refraining from other measures which would require more inti-
mate control over the sector. It can also be noted that liberalisation in time could
lead to much more competitive electricity markets. This may render the assump-
tion behind full cost pricing on the existence of competitive markets somewhat
less heroic and render the application of the theory somewhat less problematic.
1. Nick Eyre, 1996.
2. J. Keppler, 1996; Nick Eyre, 1996.Working Paper 3-98
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IV ExternE data on external costs and 
economic instruments for full cost 
pricing
External damage cost estimates could be used to set charge rates for emissions.
Emissions of important pollutants (SO2, NOx, particulate matter, and CO2) would
be charged per ton of pollutant. A major advantage of setting charge rates in this
way is certainly the high environmental efficiency that can be expected. Com-
pared to other possible economic instruments, there is a direct link between the
damage and the charge rate, and the tax weighs more heavily on the more pollut-
ing technologies and fuels. Producers, when trying to minimise costs, receive a
strong signal to adjust technological and fuel choices towards more environmen-
tally friendly alternatives.
The welfare advantages to be expected from such a charge are potentially high.
Using a dynamic partial equilibrium model of the Belgian electricity market, S.
Proost and J. Van Rompuy1 compare the imposition of a generalised emission tax
(levied on central and de-central producers) to the present situation where exist-
ent emission regulation is maintained. They conclude that when emission taxes
equal to the marginal environmental damages, as obtained earlier in the EC Ex-
ternE project, are imposed, important welfare gains can be achieved. Present
regulation essentially includes the 1988 Large Combustion Plant Directive, sup-
plemented with a sector agreement between the central electricity producers and
the authorities, that limits total emissions of SO2 and NOx for the period 1993 to
2003. There are no regulated limits on CO2 emissions.
Investment or dispatch adders can also be expected to raise welfare. Investment
or planning adders act as a surcharge to internalise a cost per unit of emission.
When added hypothetically to the private costs during the planning process,
adders serve as shadow prices that result in the selection of new resources that
better minimise total social costs. Similarly, dispatch adders would act as a poten-
tial tax to internalise a cost per unit emission into decisions about the operation
of individual power plants. Up to now no utility has used dispatch adders but
studies have shown that such adders would result in substantial and immediate
benefits.
Investment adders, on the contrary, have been used by several public utilities in
different states in the US. A problem with their application is that in the short and
medium run they may have a perverse outcome. Although inclusion of the
adders in investment decisions results in the addition of clean capacity to existing
1. S. Proost and J. Van Rompuy, 1996.Working Paper 3-98
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capacity, emissions increase because the newer plants tends not to be called into
operation because of their higher production costs. To be effective, such adders
should in the short and medium run be complemented with some other emission
limiting mechanism, e.g. dispatch adders.
ExternE damage costs, expressed per tonne of pollutant, could be used as emis-
sion charge rates. Figure 1 gives emission charge rates using ExternE damage cost
estimates for the coal, natural gas, and nuclear fuel cycles. In comparison, corre-
sponding rates that would have resulted from the application of a CO2/energy
tax, as proposed in 1992 by the European Commission, are pictured. The rates of
the tax were not set in accordance to external damage cost estimates, but they pro-
vide some base of reference to appreciate the level of emission charges that would
result from Belgian ExternE damage cost estimates. The CO2/energy tax is set at
3$/barrel during the first year of implementation, and gradually increases to
10$/barrel. After that, the tax rate remains constant in real terms. 50% of the tax
was to be based on the energy content of the fuels and the other 50% on the their
energy content. For electricity, the carbon part of the tax is levied on the inputs in
electricity generation, while an energy tax rate of 2,1 ECU/MWh is defined, in-
creasing to 7 ECU/MWh in the last year of introduction of the tax. The latter part,
the energy tax, is the only tax that is levied on electricity produced from non-fossil
sources. The objective of the CO2/energy tax was to provide an incentive to re-
duce CO2 emissions (carbon part of the tax) and to increase energy efficiency
(energy part).
The 1992 CO2/energy tax rates would not have attained the level of the marginal
external damage costs. This does not necessarily mean that the proposed rates
were too low, or non-optimal. As reasoned above, “mapping” damage costs
straight into tax levels is not necessarily the best solution from a welfare point of
view. It can also be noted from figure 1 that, for fossil fuel based generation (coal
and natural gas), the carbon part of the CO2/energy tax is somewhat lower than
ExternE global warming damage for Belgian coal and gas plants. The CO2/energy
tax for nuclear electricity, on the contrary, would have been higher than Belgian
ExternE damage costs for the nuclear fuel cycle. One of the reasons for the inclu-
sion of an energy part in the CO2/energy tax, which is the only tax on electricity
from nuclear sources, was to reduce the risk of increasing distortions on the Eu-
ropean electricity market. Without the energy part of the tax, the tax burden
imposed on countries with strongly diverging power generation structures, e.g.
due to different shares of nuclear power in total electricity production capacity,
would have been very unequal.
Emission charges in line with damage costs would result in the highest charge for
coal plants (retrofitted or not) and the lowest for nuclear plants. Although the
CO2/energy tax was not designed to explicitly take the emission of specific pol-
lutants into account, except for CO2, it would also have resulted in a certain
differentiation of its impact per type of fuel, similar to an emission charge. The
reason of course is that the CO2/energy tax was to be based partly on the carbon
content of the input fuels. However, the differentiation of the tax burden over dif-
ferent fuels would be less outspoken than in the case of an emission charge, even
in a case of an emission charge in a situation where all coal based plants are ret-
rofitted (see figure 1).Working Paper 3-98
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One problem with the application of an emission charge lies in the regional scale
of the acidification problem and the international scale of global warming. The
majority of the damages provoked by Belgian electricity producers occur outside
of the boundaries. In these circumstances, without international agreement or co-
ordination of a tax or charge system, national authorities have no incentive to set
charge rates at levels corresponding to damage costs. On the contrary, if Belgium
unilaterally decides to implement emission charges, an effective charge may hurt
its own industry. This is even more the case with the advent of the internal market
for electricity where large industrial consumers can shop around for power.
Moreover, although in principle such a charge is not in contradiction with the in-
ternal market, border tax adjustments may in practice render the application of a
national instrument difficult1. The transboundary nature of the environmental
problem and the rather limited room for manoeuvre of individual Member States
to develop strong environmental policy initiatives within the internal market
seem to call for an internationally co-ordinated or common instrument.
1. The imposition of the charge (or a replacing levy) on imported electricity and the de-taxation of 
exported electricity within the internal market in principle do not pose a problem. Duties with 
similar effect as customs duties on imports or exports are allowed if they are part of a general tax 
system, which should then be applied without discrimination on the basis of the origin of the 
products and according to objective criteria. Products from another country should not bear a 
heavier tax burden than domestic products. Levying an emission charge on imported electricity 
requires that emissions from the production of imported electricity are known, which may be 
problematic. A replacing levy could be imposed, e.g. based on average emission rates for the 
exporting country, but such a levy could be contrary to WTO rules.Working Paper 3-98
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FIGURE 1 - ExternE marginal damage costs (3% discount rate, except 0% for nuclear, 10.000 year horizon for nuclear, 
global warming: 18 ECU/tonne CO2) and a CO2/energy tax.
Source: Federal Planning Office, using ExternE data from VITO.
With respect to regional air pollutants, a European approach for a co-ordinated or
common economic instrument such as emission charges are not on the table for
the moment. In the proposal on a EU strategy to combat acidification of March
1997, the European Commission encourages Member States to use economic in-
struments to meet proposed national emission ceilings in a cost-effective way,
without making concrete proposals for the co-ordination of an economic instru-
ment at the European level. The emphasis of the adopted strategy is on further
regulation. Main elements of the strategy include the establishment of national
emission ceilings for each acid rain pollutant, the ratification of the UN protocol
on further reductions of sulphur emissions, the proposal for a directive limiting
the sulphur content of heavy fuel oils, and a review of the Large Combustion
Plant Directive (Dir. 88/609/EC).
With respect to the formulation of an answer to the global greenhouse challenge,
and the reduction of CO2 emissions and other greenhouse gases, industrialised
"Annex 1" countries are expected to set new emission reduction targets for the pe-
riod after 2000 at the Kyoto Conference in December 1997. The discussion within
the EU on how to meet possible new objectives and on (internationally co-ordinat-
ed) policy instruments to achieve them will take place during 1998. Meanwhile,
many industrialised countries, including Belgium, are unlikely to reach CO2 emis-















































































































































The only European proposal for an economic instrument in the energy domain is
the 1997 proposal for the restructuring of the Community framework for the tax-
ation of energy products. This is discussed in the next point.Working Paper 3-98
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V The European Commission's proposal 
on the restructuring of the Community 
framework for the taxation of energy 
products in the EC
The European Commission recently adopted a proposal for a Directive that wid-
ens the scope of the Community minimum rate system, presently limited to
mineral oils, to all energy products. This proposal presents a consistent frame-
work of taxation for the energy sector, while allowing Member States the
flexibility to charge more than the minimum tax rates. The proposal is intended
to reduce the existing distortions of competition in the internal market for energy.
In addition, the proposal gives the Member States the flexibility to differentiate
the rates of taxation on the basis of environmental criteria, while complying with
the minimum rates.
The proposal for a Directive includes within its scope all energy products: apart
from the mineral oils already covered by the existing European system on mini-
mum excise duty rates, these are chiefly coal, natural gas and electricity. As
regards electricity, the proposal provides for the taxation of output at the final
consumption stage. Member states are also authorised to refund to the producer
the tax paid by the consumer where they wish to encourage the use of renewable
energy sources.
The proposed rates are intended to lead to a closer approximation of national
rates in three two-year stages. A low level is set for newly taxed products, such as
electricity, which will bear rates of 1 mECU/KWh (as from 1-1-1998), 2 mECU/KWh
(as from 1-1-2000) and 3 mECU/KWh (as from 1-1-2002). The minimum level of
taxation for the last stage, as from 2002, are put forward as target rates and will
need to be confirmed as binding in a subsequent proposal from the Commission.
Energy products used as inputs in electricity production are exempted from the
imposition of minimum rates. The proposal leaves open the possibility for Mem-
ber States to tax these products, in order to achieve environmental objectives. If
Member States decide to implement such (non-harmonised) input taxes on ener-
gy products used in electricity production, then these taxes do not count in order
to attain the defined minimum rates for electricity.
Although the main objective of this proposal is to take a step forward in the har-
monisation of energy tax rates and the realisation of the internal energy market,
the proposed tax structure clearly has a number of environmental objectives as
well. While specific tax rates are defined for each product and type of use, ratesWorking Paper 3-98
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overall are defined in relation to the energy content of products1. This can be con-
sidered as a development from the 1992 proposal on a CO2/energy tax, which
contained a carbon component besides an energy component. In contrast to the
CO2/energy tax proposal, the recent 1997 proposal does not have a carbon com-
ponent, but it leaves room for Member States to adopt higher rates than the
minima, in order to come closer to a fiscal structure accommodating environmen-
tal impacts.
The proposed electricity tax is an output tax, levied on the amount of electricity
used. Compared to an emission charge (or to an input tax as a proxy for an emis-
sion charge), an output tax has a less direct relation to the pollution generated and
its effectiveness is considered to be lower compared to that of an emission charge.
The output tax is imposed after technological and fuel choices have already been
made and so does not affect them. The output tax on electricity can have an im-
pact on pollution levels through a reduction in the general demand level for
electricity. The advantage of this approach is that it can easily be implemented
and that tax collection is straightforward. Moreover, the destination principle,
whereby energy products traded within the Community are taxed in the country
where consumption takes place, is respected in a straightforward way.
We consider two alternative policy scenarios for compliance in Belgium with the
proposed European tax rates2. A first scenario is that Belgium applies the mini-
mum rates. A second scenario would be for Belgium to introduce higher rates
than the minimum rates, e.g. to consider the European rates as additional to the
existing Belgian rates, at least in the residential and the transport sector. Rates for
industry are kept at the minimum level in this second scenario, for reasons of in-
ternational competitiveness.
Figure 2 pictures the first alternative. Existing taxes (except VAT) must be taken
into account for attainment of the defined minimum rates. In Belgium, a "special
contribution on energy" was introduced as of 1-8-93. For low voltage electricity
this levy amounts to 1,375 mECU/KWh (0,055 BF/KWh) while high voltage electric-
ity bears a zero rate. For residential and commercial electricity use, therefore, the
existing rate is already higher than required in the first phase of the European
proposal. The existing rate of 1,375 mECU/KWh will need to be raised by 0,625
mECU/KWh on 1-1-2000 and by 1,625 mECU/KWh on 1-1-2002 in order to attain the
proposed minimum rates. For industry, currently bearing no excise taxes, increas-
es equal minimum rates, except when exemptions or reductions apply. Electricity
used in chemical reduction processes or in electrolytic and metallurgical process-
es is exempted from the tax. Member States may furthermore apply partial or
total reductions in the tax amount on the part of a company’s energy costs, not
linked to transport, that exceeds 10% of its total production costs.
In the alternative scenario, Belgium could decide to set tax rates higher than the
proposed European minimum rates. Figure 3 pictures the decision to apply min-
imum rates for residential users on top of existing rates. For industrial users,
minima would still apply in this option. Also in this option electricity tax rates
would remain far below aggregated damage per KWh.
1. For motoring fuels, rates have traditionally been much higher than implied by their energy con-
tent.
2. Stéphane Willems, Nadine Gouzée, August 1997.Working Paper 3-98
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FIGURE 2 - ExternE aggregated marginal damage cost for Belgium and proposed European electricity tax rates.
Alternative I: adherence to proposed minimum rates.
Source: Federal Planning Office, using ExternE data from VITO.
The proposed minimum rates for electricity, going from 1 mECU/KWh to 3 mECU/
KWh in three phases, remain far below the aggregated damage cost for the Belgian
power sector, which amounts to 34,35 mECU/KWh (assuming global warming
damages of 18 ECU/tonne CO2). Even acknowledging that the externality that
should "best" be used to internalise damage may substantially differ from Ex-
ternE damage figures, the risk that the proposed electricity tax levels would result
in economic costs seems small. The proposed European rates are not fixed in ac-
cordance with environmental damage costs, but are rather set in line with the
general philosophy behind the proposal, which is to offer a harmonised tax struc-
ture with low rates for newly taxed products.
Important information in the Belgian ExternE damage costs relates to the sub-
stantial differentiation of damages resulting from different types of plants and
input fuels. This suggests that a policy of internalisation of external damage cost
should take these variations properly into account, if it is to produce welfare ben-
efits. A drawback of the electricity output tax compared to the CO2/energy tax
(and certainly compared to an emission charge) is that it does not vary with the
type of input fuel. Nevertheless, the European proposal leaves Member States the
possibility to levy additional taxes on inputs, but such a variant has not been in-
cluded in Figure 2. The possibility of setting the rates for such additional, non-
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FIGURE 3 - ExternE aggregated marginal damage cost for Belgium and proposed European electricity tax rates.
Alternative II: higher than minimum rates.
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VI Conclusion
Although the availability of data on external environmental damage cost should
allow for the application of full cost pricing theory, in practice this is not straight-
forward. The theoretical framework behind the internalisation of external costs
relies on a number of assumptions that are hardly met in reality, e.g. the existence
of clear preferences and the existence of competitive markets. In the presence of
distortions on electricity markets, setting tax rates equal to marginal external
damage costs no longer necessarily leads to welfare maximisation.
Having this limitation in mind, in this paper, aggregated residual damage levels
and damages for individual Belgian reference plants were compared to tax rates
following from the European Commission proposals on a CO2/energy tax and,
more recently, on the restructuring of the Community framework for the taxation
of energy products in the EC. On the whole, proposed tax levels remain lower
than the damage costs. Although this does not necessarily imply that the pro-
posed tax instruments are “non-optimal”, the risk of setting too high tax levels in
the recent proposal on the restructuring of energy taxation appears limited.
Both total aggregated damages resulting from power generation as well as mar-
ginal damage resulting from specific fuel cycles, especially coal, are high. The
state of affairs seems to suggest two possible ways to proceed, which do not ex-
clude each other but should rather be pursued in parallel. One option would be
to continue research on how the theoretical framework on full cost pricing could
be extended in order to take more realistic, “second best” options into account. In-
teresting in this respect should be to investigate how external damage costs
should be corrected in order to provide “optimal” levels for the application of
economic instruments such as environmental taxes. The design of environmental
taxation instruments has to consider a number of elements that have to do with
the effectiveness, practicability, income distribution issues, etc. Calculating “the-
oretically correct” tax levels could provide a useful input into such a policy
design process.
A second option would be to look for more pragmatic ways to insert knowledge
on external damage costs in energy taxation policy at the European level. The
height of external damage costs measured in the ExternE project are substantial
and even if the theory cannot be applied in a straightforward way, the potential
welfare gains to be expected from levying emission charges or setting energy tax-
es in accordance with the measured damage levels cannot be ignored. There seem
to be a number of opportunities for such an approach. One possibility would call
for greater attention in the European proposal for evidence on the high level of
the externalities in general and on the strong differences between damages
caused by types of plants in particular.Working Paper 3-98
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When setting energy taxes for environmental purposes, a balance must be struck
between economic efficiency and ease of implementation of the tax from a fiscal
point of view. The environmental damage associated with different input fuels
(and technologies) is widely different, suggesting that the welfare loss of not re-
flecting them in tax rates may be substantial. In the proposed European electricity
tax, however, the balance has been struck appears to be more in favour of fiscal
practicability, to the detriment of economic efficiency. Setting a consumption tax
allows to respect the country of destination principle and at the same time sim-
plifies levying of the tax. However, the potential cost in terms of welfare is high.
The tax renders electricity mildly more expensive, which may somewhat reduce
demand. This strategy may not be very effective given the generally low price
elasticity of electricity demand. The high potential for providing an incentive to-
wards more environmentally friendly fuels and towards more energy efficiency
at the generation or supply stage is ignored. The environmental damage associ-
ated with different input fuels (and technologies) is widely different, suggesting
that the welfare loss of not reflecting them in tax rates may be substantial. These
arguments would call for taxation on inputs or at the production stage, which
renders respect of the country of destination principle more complex. The ques-
tion is then how a balance can be found between the environmental effectiveness
and economic efficiency, on the one hand, and the practicability of an EC wide tax-
ation system, on the other. This trade-off was also felt at the time the CO2/energy
tax was under discussion, when several options were suggested according to
which electricity production would be taxed on the basis of substitute values for
the inputs in electricity generation1. Several variations can be imagined with re-
spect to a taxation system based on such substitute values, resulting in varying
compromises between practicability and economic efficiency.
One option would be to choose the substitute values close to the inputs into gen-
eration for each individual producer. The tax paid by each producer would be
based on the external damage caused per unit produced during a past period, e.g.
one year. The tax for the producer is the equivalent of a “deferred” production
tax, expressed in terms of a consumption tax. National fiscal authorities would
need to define in advance the level of the tax for each producer, based on ExternE
costs. De-taxation and re-taxation of intra-community trade in electricity would
be relatively straightforward, as since the tax per unit of traded electricity is ex-
actly known, and re-taxation in the importing country would be equal to de-
taxation in the exporting country, using the same rates. The main advantage of
this system is that electricity produced is almost completely taxed in function of
the damage that it provokes. The economic efficiency thus approaches very much
that of a tax solely applied at the production stage. However, such a system risks
to impose an administrative burden on fiscal authorities. It also leads to different
tax levels for what end-users consider the same product (but which in essence is
not, in terms of environmental damage).
Failing a reconsideration of European energy taxation and the tax rates therein
more along the lines of external cost evidence, the application of the European
proposal, supposing it is accepted, in individual Member States still seems to of-
fer other possibilities to take into account our improved knowledge on the
damage of electricity generation. Theoretical difficulties with the application of
the internalisation framework in taxes notwithstanding, the strong variation of
damage costs levels by fuel type suggests society is to gain from the reflection of
1. European Commission, May 1992.Working Paper 3-98
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these discrepancies into economic instruments. An adequate policy instrument
should reflect this and by way of illustration, two possibilities are put forward in
relation to the proposal.
• The proposed taxation framework includes a consumption tax on electricity
and allows Member States to supplement the output tax with a (non-harmo-
nised) tax on the inputs used in electricity generation. If Member States
decide to implement such an input tax, the rates for it could be set in accord-
ance with external damage costs. Setting of the rates in this way would pro-
vide a powerful incentive to producers to switch towards more
environmentally friendly inputs or technologies.
• The proposal also allows Member States to refund to electricity producers
the revenues from the electricity produced form renewable energy sources.
Subsidisation criteria could take into consideration the external costs of the
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